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12 Myths about
Individual Accounts for
Social Security Reform
This article highlights research from John
Turner’s new book, Individual Accounts
for Social Security Reform—International
Perspectives on the U.S. Debate, which was
published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7 for
details.

T

he recent federal budget proposal
provides hundreds of billions of dollars
to establish individual accounts as part
of Social Security reform. The budget
includes funding necessary to establish
voluntary carve-out accounts, which are
accounts that would partially replace
Social Security. Workers who choose
these accounts would receive reduced
Social Security benefits, and in exchange
would have part of their retirement
income based on the investment
performance of the account. The United
Kingdom is the only high-income country
that uses these accounts, but the number
of British workers participating in them
has declined by about 20 percent since
its peak in 1993, despite growth in the
labor force. The Pensions Commission,
a national commission in the United
Kingdom assigned to propose major
reforms, has recommended abolishing
those accounts.
This article examines 12 myths about
individual accounts and how they would
work if they were an option for Social
Security participants. These myths persist
because they contain elements of truth,
though usually in a different context. For

example, some myths about voluntary
carve-out accounts are true statements
for mandatory add-on accounts that
would be provided in addition to
Social Security. Some myths are true in
idealized situations but not in the actual
implementation of individual accounts.
Some contain elements of truth that are
outweighed by other considerations in a
more complete analysis.
Myth 1. Voluntary carve-out accounts
are similar to 401(k) plans or the Thrift
Savings Plan for federal government
workers.
All three are individual accounts, and
some lessons can be learned from the
experience with 401(k) plans and the
Thrift Savings Plan. However, in this
context the salient feature of 401(k) plans
and the Thrift Savings Plan is that both
are add-on account plans. They do not
reduce workers’ Social Security benefits,
as would occur for voluntary carve-out
accounts. In addition, the Thrift Savings
Plan’s reported administrative cost, often
considered a benchmark, considerably
understates the cost of a Social Security
program of individual accounts because
the government subsidizes the Thrift
Savings Plan’s administrative costs.
Myth 2. Voluntary carve-out accounts
would foster an ownership society.
Workers own outright their 401(k)
plan accounts. However, with a voluntary
carve-out account, while workers own the
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balance in the account, the money used
to fund the account is a loan that workers
must pay back with interest through a cut
in their future Social Security benefits.
Thus, voluntary carve-out accounts could
be characterized as fostering a debt
society.
Myth 3. Voluntary carve-out accounts
would increase national savings.
Whether add-on accounts increase
national savings is controversial (Orszag
and Stiglitz 2001). However, voluntary
carve-out accounts are much less likely to
do so. The worker finances them through
the implicit borrowing from the Social
Security program. Also, the government
would likely borrow for at least part of
the transition costs of paying current
retirees’ benefits.
Myth 4. Workers would only choose
a voluntary carve-out account if that
choice made them better off.
Well-informed workers making
rational decisions who voluntarily
choose an option are made better off.
However, in the United Kingdom, many
workers who have chosen voluntary
carve-out accounts have been made
worse off because they were wrongfully
influenced in the “misselling” scandal.
The magnitude of their errors is immense.
These workers have been reimbursed $26
billion by financial service providers in
an economy a sixth as large as United
States.’
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experience has shown that because they
are created by legislators in a political
environment, they frequently are subject
to political risk. For example, in Sweden,
the default fund, which most new
participants invest in, does not invest
in Coca Cola because of the Swedish
government’s objections to some of Coca
Cola’s policies.
Myth 7. Individual accounts would
reduce government involvement in the
retirement income system.
The government would probably
provide a reduced percentage of
retirement income if there were Social
Security individual accounts. However,
the Social Security Administration’s
bureaucracy could easily double due
to the recordkeeping requirements for
voluntary carve-out accounts (Hart et al.
2001). The government would also have
an expanded role through its regulatory
oversight of individual accounts.

Myth 5. A worker’s survivors would
be better off if the worker chose a
voluntary carve-out account.
Survivors could inherit the balance of
the individual account if the account has
not been annuitized. However, the worker
with a voluntary carve-out account would
give up some of the survivors insurance
that Social Security provides. If that
worker dies at a young age, the account
balance would be small, and the survivors
would generally be better off with the
full survivor benefits that Social Security
provides.

Myth 8. Low-income workers would be
better off with individual accounts.
Low-income workers tend to not
own stock; thus, having an individual
account could diversify their sources of
retirement income. However, workers
with low income are poorly situated to
bear stock market risk because of their
limited ability to absorb downside risk.
Also, the rate of return that low-income
workers receive from Social Security
tends to be higher than for higher-income
workers because of the progressivity of
Social Security’s benefit formula. The
taxation of the Social Security benefits
of higher earners further reduces their
rate of return from Social Security. Thus,
high-income workers have more to gain
from individual accounts that substitute
for Social Security than do low-income
workers. In addition, the level of financial
literacy among low-income workers tends
to be low, so they would be more prone
to costly investment errors. Relatively
few low-income workers in the United
Kingdom participate in the voluntary
carve-out individual accounts.

Myth 6. Individual accounts would be
free from political risk.
Individual accounts, in principle, can
be managed so that they are free from
political risk. However, international

Myth 9. Workers would be good
financial managers of their individual
accounts.
Some workers would be good
financial managers. However, experience



with 401(k) plans and the mandatory
individual accounts in Sweden indicates
that many workers make errors in
choosing their investments and in the
timing of changes in their investments.
Some workers follow trends, buying
high and selling low. Many workers who
are financially vulnerable have a low
level of financial literacy, and lack of
financial literacy appears to be a cause
of workers making investment errors.
Demographic literacy is also important.
Surveys have found that many workers
underestimate their life expectancy, and
do not understand the probability of
living longer than their life expectancy,
which would cause them to plan for a
shorter retirement period than they likely
will experience.
Myth 10. The rate of return workers
receive from individual accounts would
be higher than what they receive from
Social Security.
Stocks on average earn a higher
gross rate of return than the implicit
rate of return workers receive on
their contributions to Social Security.
However, if appropriate adjustments are
made, on average the two rates of return
would be equivalent (Brown, Hassett,
and Smetters 2005). Those adjustments
include taking into account the higher
risk in stocks, the higher administrative
costs of individual accounts, the value
of the various forms of insurance
Social Security provides, the cost of
annuitization of account balances, and
the higher taxes ultimately needed to pay
transition costs to an individual account
system. The comparison also assumes
that workers do not make serious errors
in financial management.
Myth 11. Individual accounts would
not redistribute income.
Individual accounts can be disbursed
as lump sum benefits, which do not
redistribute income. However, when
they are annuitized, they perversely
(regressively) redistribute income from
low- to high-wage workers who tend
to have longer life expectancy and thus
receive benefits for more years. If lowerincome workers receive lower rates of
return than higher-income workers, that
would also cause an adverse change in
the distribution of retirement income.
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Myth 12. Individual accounts would
not affect labor supply and retirement
age because they closely link
contributions and benefits.
There is a close link between
contributions and the amount invested in
an individual account. Also, individual
accounts would not be financed by an
explicit tax, which would distort labor
supply. However, the volatility in stock
and bond markets causes there to be
a weak link between contributions
and benefits. Further, a mandatory
contribution, whatever its link to
benefits, can be an implicit tax because
it is mandatory. If the mandatory
contributions act like an implicit tax, that
would discourage workers from working
and encourage them to retire. The low
participation rates of workers in Latin
American mandatory accounts may
result from such an effect on their labor
supply. In addition, a sharp downturn in
equity markets can cause workers with
individual accounts to delay retirement,
with that effect occurring at a time when
the demand for labor is reduced.
John Turner is a senior policy advisor
at the AARP Public Policy Institute in
Washington, D.C.
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Earnings Losses
for Injured Workers
S

ince publishing Adequacy of
Earnings Replacement in Workers’
Compensation Programs in 2004 (Hunt
2004), staff at the Upjohn Institute have
continued to analyze the important
policy issues discussed in the report. The
National Academy of Social Insurance
(NASI) study panel that produced the
report found that earnings replacement
for permanent partial disabilities
in five states ranged from 29 to 46
percent—a rate far short of the 67 percent
replacement rate specified by statute
in these state workers’ compensation
systems. Thus, the analysis raised
concerns about the adequacy of workers’
compensation earnings replacement
benefits.

The NASI study panel’s
analysis raised concerns about
the adequacy of workers’
compensation earnings
replacement benefits.

However, there were some problems
with these findings. First, employer
Hart, Larence E., Mark Kearney,
representatives on the study panel
Carol Musil, and Kelly Olsen. 2001.
objected to using the two-thirds
“SSA’s Estimates of Administrative
earnings replacement standard for
Costs under a Centralized Program of
permanent partial disability (PPD)
Individual Accounts.” Social Security
cases. They asserted that because
Administration, January 9.
such cases are frequently disputed
and their compensation may be the
Orszag, Peter R., and Joseph E.
result of compromise settlements, it
Stiglitz. 2001. “Rethinking Pension
is inappropriate to expect such claims
Reform: Ten Myths about Social Security
to achieve the two-thirds standard.
Systems.” In New Ideas about Old Age
Therefore, the study panel believed
Security: Toward Sustainable Pension
it would be beneficial to assess the
Systems in the Twenty-First Century,
adequacy of temporary total disability
Robert Holzmann and Joseph E. Stiglitz,
benefits.
eds. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp.
In addition, there were analytical
17–56.
issues that affected the results, even
Read the first chapter of Dr. Turner’s book at though the same assumptions had been
used for studying the five states. Because
http://www.upjohninstitute.org/publications/ch1/iassr.pdf.

the analysis focused on aggregate wage
losses and aggregate compensation
payments, it implicitly weighted the
more serious claims more heavily. The
longer the wage loss continues, the more
times the injured worker is counted in
the aggregate wage losses. But is the
policy question, what proportion of all
the wages lost by injured workers is
replaced? Or is it, what proportion of all
injured workers received adequate wage
replacement? The earlier studies answer
the first question, but not the second.
Data Analysis
To find the answer to that question,
the Upjohn Institute contracted with the
State of Oregon for administrative data
that enabled us to perform a sensitivity
analysis of benefit adequacy in Oregon’s
workers’ compensation system. Our
empirical work uses a dataset composed
of 46,033 Oregon workers injured
in 1992 or 1993. They all received
temporary disability payments of at
least three days, or PPD compensation.
We exclude workers with disabilities
lasting less than three days, and those
with missing values for certain key
variables. We also exclude workers aged
51 and older at the time of injury in
order to reduce the effect of voluntary
early retirement on postinjury wage loss
calculations.
We have unemployment insurance
data, which consist of quarterly wage
records for all Oregon workers from the
first quarter of 1988 through the fourth
quarter of 1998. We were able to match
98.8 percent of injured workers to their
administrative wage records (based on a
unique but anonymous identifier provided
for each worker). The resulting dataset
combines claims-related data such as date
and type of injury, compensation benefits,
length of absence from work, and
demographic variables, with the pre- and



